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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kenneth Wayne Lamb pled guilty to one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under 16, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508. Although the prosecutor recommended a 
significantly lower fixed sentence, the District Court instead imposed a unified sentence 
of twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed, and ten years indeterminate. The District 
Court failed to sufficiently consider all of the mitigating factors present in this case -
most notably, that Mr. Lamb accepted responsibility, had severe substance abuse issues, 
had no prior felony record, had significant mental health issues, and received a 
recommendation from the State which equated to a third of the sentence actually imposed 
- and therefore the District Court abused its discretion in imposing that sentence. 
Mr. Lamb submits that the District Court abused its discretion and acted in 
manifest disregard of Idaho law, when the Court failed to require a mental health 
evaluation in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-2522. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On November 9, 2011, Corporal Donahue of the Canyon County Sheriffs Office 
received a call from police dispatch regarding a potential sex offense. Donahue 
responded to West Valley Medical Center and met with Caldwell City Police deputies, 
who had detained Kenneth Wayne Lamb. Mr. Lamb had been read his Miranda rights by 
Caldwell City Police officer C. Ivie, who detained Mr. Lamb after Lamb admitted to 
having intercourse with his minor stepdaughter,  
1 The Statement of Facts is derived from the PreSentence Investigation Report at p. 2. 
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The attending physician to a patient named  aged 12 at the time, 
had determined that Ms. Kennedy was eight weeks pregnant. Further, Ms. Kennedy 
named Kenneth Wayne Lamb, her stepfather, as the father of the child. Mr. Lamb 
admitted that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms. Kennedy, his stepdaughter, 
and was the father of the child. 
Lamb was interviewed by officers. He admitted that he had been engaging in 
sexual intercourse with Ms. Kennedy for at least the past three months, sometimes on a 
daily basis while other times at a rate of approximately three times per week. 
The State issued a Criminal Complaint against Mr. Lamb on November 9, 2011, 
charging Mr. Lamb with one count of Lewd Conduct With a Minor Under 16, a violation 
of Idaho Code § 18-1508. (R., pp. 6-7). A Preliminary Hearing was waived. An 
Information was filed on November 23, 2011, containing the same charge as the 
Complaint. (R., pp. 16-1 7). 
Mr. Lamb changed his plea to guilty on January 30, 2012, based on a loosely-
defined plea agreement between the parties. (See Tr., p. 6). The Court scheduled the 
case for sentencing on April 2, 2012, ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report 
("PSR"), and ordered a psycho-sexual evaluation for sentencing purposes. (R., pp. 40-
41 ). The District Court apparently ordered a mental health evaluation pursuant to LC. 
§ 19-2522 (see Tr., p. 26), but a mental health evaluation was not obtained or completed. 
(See generally, R.; PSR.) 
At Mr. Lamb's Sentencing Hearing, the District Court imposed a unified sentence 
of twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed and ten years indeterminate. (Tr., pp. 56-




1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it imposed an excessive 
unified sentence of twenty-five years, with :fifteen years fixed, upon Mr. Lamb following 
his plea of guilty to Lewd Conduct? 
2. Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it failed to require a 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Unified 
Sentence Of Twenty-Five Years, With Fifteen Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Lamb Following 
His Plea Of Guiltv To Lewd Conduct 
A. Introduction 
Kenneth Wayne Lamb did not proceed to trial, but rather pled guilty prior to trial. 
He accepted responsibility for his conduct and pled guilty to one count of Lewd Conduct 
With a Minor. The Government recommended a sentence of 5 years determinate and life 
indeterminate. (Tr., p. 47). The defense recommended a sentence of retained 
jurisdiction. (Tr., pp. 36-37). 
Following his plea of guilty, the District Court sentenced Mr. Lamb to a unified 
sentence of twenty-five (25) years, with fifteen (15) years determinate. (Tr., pp. 56-57). 
Several mitigating factors were present in Mr. Lamb's case, all of which indicated 
that a more lenient sentence would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the fact 
that even the prosecuting attorney's recommended sentence was significantly shorter than 
the one imposed by the District Court. Other mitigating factors included the facts that 
Mr. Lamb accepted responsibility for his actions, had no prior felony record, had severe 
substance abuse issues, and suffered from significant mental health issues. 
The District Court's insufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors, and 
therefore, its insufficient consideration of Idaho's recognized sentencing objectives, 
caused it to impose an excessive sentence in an abuse of its discretion. This Court should 
remedy that abuse. 
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B. The District Court Failed To Sufficiently Consider The Mitigating Factors Present 
In This Case And So Imposed An Excessive Sentence, With A Fixed Term More 
Than Three Times As Long As Even The State Recommended 
1. Introduction 
Mr. Lamb asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of twenty-
five years, with fifteen years fixed, is excessive. When a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct 
an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 
103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)(quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Lamb does not allege that his sentence 
exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, 
he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, 
are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; 
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and ( 4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
The protection of society is the primary objective the sentencing court should consider. 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 ( 1993 ). Therefore, a sentence that protects 
society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; 
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of 
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be 
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
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The appellate court should consider several factors to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 
(2006). They include, but are not limited to "the defendant's good character, status as a 
first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and 
support of family2." Id.; see also LC. §19-2521 (wherein the Legislature articulated 
several factors it suggested the sentencing court consider in its determination of whether 
to place the defendant on probation, or whether the facts indicate that it should depart 
from that result and impose a prison sentence).3 Insufficient consideration of these 
factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. 
State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. 
App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other 
grounds, 117 Idaho 295,301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,595 (1982). In this 
case, several of those factors were present, but were insufficiently considered by the 
2 Mr. Lamb had clear and strong support from his family, as noted by the District Court 
at his Sentencing Hearing. (Tr., p. 58). This factor was clearly met in Mr. Lamb's case. 
3 As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized in regard to this particular statute, the 
Legislature intended to provide sentencing courts with a list of factors to consider when 
exercising its discretion. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931-32 (2004). The language 
the Legislature chose to use in providing this list of factors clearly indicates that 
the sentencing court should start with the presumption that it will impose probation, 
unless it finds that society requires the more intensive protection provided by 
incarcerating the defendant. See LC.§ 19-2521(1); State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 
(2001 ); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. 
App. 1990). This does not mean that everyone convicted of a crime should be placed on 
probation. See Stover, 140 Idaho at 932; see also State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143 
(2001) (holding that where the State only provides the possibility for probation, there is 
no due process expectation that the defendant will receive probation). Rather, it only 
indicates that the Legislature suggested the district court should consider probation the 
favored result, which should be imposed unless its analysis of the factors indicates 
incarceration and more extensive punishment is necessary. See LC. § 19-2521(1). 
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District Court when it determined Mr. Lamb's sentence. As a result, his sentence did not 
serve the recognized sentencing objectives and was excessive. 
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. The Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits 
not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime 
committed. Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 2008). In addition to the 
statutory arguments submitted herein, Mr. Lamb also asserts that his sentence violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights by being greater than necessary to accomplish the goals and 
objectives of sentencing and by being disproportionate to his crime, and therefore 
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment". This Court should remedy any 
constitutional violations by reversing Mr. Lamb's sentence. 
2. Lack of Prior Record 
One of the enumerated factors under Idaho law indicating prison is inappropriate 
(lack of a prior record) directly applied to Mr. Lamb's case. See I.C. §19-2521(2)(g). 
This was Mr. Lamb's first felony conviction.4 (PSR, p. 4). In fact, it was only his second 
adult charge of any kind, his only other charge being a "fish and game" violation. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously considered the fact that the defendant had no 
felony record to be a mitigating factor which partially justified a more lenient sentence. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982); see also I.C. § 19-
2521(1 )(f), (2)(g) (indicating that where the defendant does not have a significant record, 
4 Mr. Lamb was later charged with Conspiracy To Commit Escape, a violation of Idaho 
Code §§37-2732 and 18-2505, while incarcerated on the Lewd Conduct charge. Since 
this offense occurred after Lamb's arrest herein, counsel is not considering this offense as 
a "prior offense" to the Lewd Conduct charge. 
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the sentencing court should be more disposed to suspending the sentence rather than 
opting for imprisonment). The logic in support of this proposition is that such a person 
usually does not yet have a fixed character for crime and therefore rehabilitation at this 
early stage is more likely. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227,228 (1971). 
The Idaho Supreme Court provided significant guidance on this issue in State v. 
Shideler, supra. In Shideler, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of armed robbery, 
while charges of assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime were dismissed. The district court sentenced the defendant to an 
indeterminate term of twenty years. Shildeler, 103 Idaho at 593. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the sentence under an "abuse of discretion" 
standard, and overturned the sentence. The Court found that the crime was very serious 
and threatened harm to others, and that a "substantial sentence of imprisonment" was 
required, both for protection of society and to "reflect society's condemnation of the 
defendant's behavior" and for general deterrence. Id. at 594. However, the Court looked 
closely at the defendant's personal characteristics, noting specifically that the defendant 
had no prior criminal history and had severe mental health issues. Id. 
The Supreme Court overturned the twenty-year indeterminate sentence imposed 
upon the convicted robber. The Court noted that 
"this was the defendant's first felony with no prior history of any 
criminal activity and this court has 'recognized that the first offender 
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."' 
Id.(citing State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953)(overruled on other 
grounds)). 
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The Court further noted that the defendant had accepted responsibility for his acts, 
and reduced his sentence from an indeterminate twenty year sentence to an indeterminate 
twelve year sentence, a time reduction of forty percent. Id. at 595. 
Mr. Lamb asserts that the Shideler case should guide this Court in its assessment 
of his appeal. The Shideler case provides guidance for several reasons, including the 
similarities in the defendant's mental health issues as well as their mutual acceptance of 
responsibility. It should be noted, of course, that Mr. Shideler obtained a sentence 
reduction on appeal despite having committed a violent offense which apparently 
involved use of a deadly weapon, while Mr. Lamb's offense did not contemplate or 
threaten violence or risk of death to others. Mr. Lamb's offense was serious, no doubt, 
but no one could have been seriously injured or killed as a result. Finally, the Shideler 
Court placed great significance on the lack of a prior record, similar to Mr. Lamb. See Id. 
at 595. Mr. Lamb urges this Court to give great weight to the Shideler decision. 
It is important to note that not only did Mr. Lamb have no prior felony record, at 
age 28, he also had only one misdemeanor. (PSR, p. 4). This particular misdemeanor (a 
fish and game offense) was a regulatory-type offense only, and not a crime of violence or 
a crime against others. Mr. Lamb had no prior history of violent offenses, drug-related 
offenses, or sexual-related crimes. 
Thus, Mr. Lamb's limited and non-felony criminal record, along with his 
willingness to accept responsibility for his actions, indicated that a more lenient sentence 
was appropriate. See, e.g., LC.§ 19-2521(l)(f), (2)(g); Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; State 
v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988). Based thereon, Mr. Lamb asserts that the 
District Court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
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3. Acceptance of Responsibility 
Mr. Lamb accepted responsibility for his actions, by pleading guilty and admitting 
his behavior. (Tr., p. 24). He also expressed his remorse, indicating his sorrow and 
remorse directly to the victim in the PSR. (See PSR, p. 4)(stating verbatim that "I want to 
let everyone who reads this know that I am truly sorry for what I did and I wish I could 
tell that to the victim herself", and "I feel so bad for what I did .... I wish I could tell the 
victim that I am so sorry for what I did to her.")(grammatical errors corrected). 
Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are 
critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 
2010), rev. denied. By making these acknowledgements, Mr. Lamb demonstrated that he 
had taken these critical first steps. They also demonstrated that he was and is amenable 
to treatment. (See Tr., p. 35-36). 
Additionally, Mr. Lamb's acknowledgment of guilt and his acceptance of 
responsibility, and expressions of remorse, satisfy a statutory factor "in favor of avoiding 
a sentence of imprisonment. See Idaho Code §19-2521(2). Specifically, Mr. Lamb's 
"character and attitudes ... indicate that the commission of another crime is unlikely." Id. 
at 2(i). As discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized "acceptance of 
responsibility" as an important factor in considering whether to reduce a substantial 
sentence. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 593. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently overturned an excessive sentence based in 
part on the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, in Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482 (Ct. 
App. 2008). In Cook, the defendant pled guilty to nine counts of grand theft by 
deception, having defrauded nine different families out of 1.5 million dollars. He was 
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sentenced to eight consecutive prison terms of three-to-eight years. The Court of Appeals 
considered the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, the circumstances of the offense, 
the fact that the charges arose from one continuing plan of wrongdoing, the defendant's 
age, and his complete lack of a prior criminal record. Id. at 489. The Court found the 
sentence to be excessive, holding that 
"we believe the court did not give sufficient consideration to the 
defendant's status as a first time offender, his expressions of remorse, 
[ and] the likelihood of rehabilitation and deterrence possible with a lesser 
cumulative sentence .... " Id. 
Mr. Lamb asserts that the Cook Court engaged in an appropriate weighing of all 
of the various factors at play, including the goals and objectives of sentencing under 
Idaho law, and came to a well-reasoned decision. Most importantly, Mr. Lamb notes that 
the factors considered by the Cook Court - acceptance of responsibility, the 
circumstances of the offense, the fact that the charges arose from one continuing plan of 
wrongdoing, the defendant's age, and his complete lack of a prior criminal record -
directly apply to his case and personal circumstances. Mr. Lamb respectfully requests 
that this Court adopt the Cook rationale, apply it to his case, and reduce his sentence as 
this Court deems appropriate. 
Mr. Lamb's acknowledgment of guilt, his expression of remorse, and acceptance 
of responsibility indicate a more lenient sentence was more appropriate. See Kellis, 148 
Idaho at 815. The District Court erred by failing to properly consider this factor in 
imposing an excessive sentence upon Mr. Lamb. 
4. Substance Abuse and Childhood History 
Yet another mitigating factor supported a more lenient sentence. Mr. Lamb had a 
serious substance abuse issue before and during the time of his criminal behavior. (See 
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PSR, p. 9). This substance abuse began at a young age, during Mr. Lamb's childhood, 
and included his stepfather engaging him in actual alcohol and drug usage. Id. A 
troubled childhood is yet another factor sentencing courts should consider in mitigation. 
See State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Mr. Lamb reported during 
his PSR interview that his alcohol abuse began at approximately age twelve, and 
continued up to the date of his arrest. (See PSR, p. 9). Mr. Lamb further reported that he 
began using marijuana at age 9, and was a regular daily user. Id. Finally, Mr. Lamb 
reported that he used and abused methamphetamine on a daily basis for many years, and 
abused ecstasy and LSD as well. Id. However, despite this clear record of substance 
abuse, the District Court gave little or no consideration to this factor at sentencing, barely 
giving it a mention during the Court's comments in support of its sentence. (See Tr., p. 
55, ls. 11-12.) This failure to recognize and consider Mr. Lamb's "troubled childhood", 
as concerns drug abuse and being misled to further abuse drugs and alcohol by his own 
stepparent, constitutes error. While this factor does not provide a legal defense or excuse 
for Mr. Lamb's behavior, it certainly represents a mitigating factor for the Court to 
consider. See Williamson, supra. 
Additionally, Mr. Lamb was apparently sexually abused as a child himself. See 
PSR, p. 6. This abuse occurred when Mr. Lamb was approximately five years old, and 
was committed by a trusted family member. Id. The District Court failed to even 
mention this factor during Mr. Lamb's sentencing hearing, and therefore gave it no 
consideration whatsoever. (See, generally, Tr., pp. 48-59). However, again, this factor 
further supports the notion of a "troubled childhood" for Mr. Lamb, which, under Idaho 
case law, is deserving of consideration at sentencing. See Williamson, supra. Mr. Lamb 
15 
again asserts that the District Court erred in failing to properly consider this important 
mitigating information. 
This Court should reverse for further proceedings to properly account for these 
mitigating factors. 
5. Mental Health Issues 
Finally, compounding those issues, Mr. Lamb was also diagnosed with Mood 
Disorder and "relevant personality issues. (See PSR, attachment 1, pp. 1; attachment 2, 
p.14). Additionally, Mr. Lamb's Substance Abuse Assessment indicated that his 
symptoms were "consistent with a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder." (PSR, 
attachment 1, p. 5). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 
not only suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a 
sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). For at least one year prior 
to his arrest, and likely longer, although the evaluations focused only on the prior twelve 
months, Mr. Lamb reported that such symptoms affected his behavior. (See, generally, 
PSR, attachment 1, pp. 5-7). In fact, in order to address these issues in relation to his 
behavior, it was recommended that he potentially receive counseling and psychotropic 
medication. Id. at p. 7. 
Again, although the Court did mention mental health issues at Mr. Lamb's 
sentencing hearing, the Court provided no explanation as to whether they entered into the 
Court's consideration, and seemed to indicate that these mental health issues were being 
treated as aggravating, rather than mitigating, factors. (See Tr., p. 55, ls. 3-10). Mr. 
Lamb asserts that the District Court committed error by failing to properly consider his 
mental health issues at sentencing, and urges this Court to remand his case to remedy this 
error. 
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6. Plea Recommendation of Prosecuting Attorney 
The prosecuting attorney, society's representative in this matter, agreed that a 
sentence of five years determinate, followed by an indeterminate term of life, was 
appropriate in this case. (Tr., p. 47). Such a sentence, in even the prosecutor's eyes, 
would have sufficiently addressed the sentencing goals and objectives.5 Id. 
However, the District Court imposed a fixed or determinate term which was 300 
percent longer than the prosecutor recommended. (Compare Tr., p. 47 with p. 57). Such 
a sentence was inappropriate because sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force 
the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased 
the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 
(Ct. App. 1988). Mr. Lamb was only 28 years old when he was sentenced. (PSR, p. 1 ). 
Yet his sentence, if it stands, would ensure that he ~ill be incarcerated for at least fifteen 
years (more than half his currentage) regardless of his rehabilitative efforts or maturation 
during that time. As such, his sentence operates contrary to the admonitions in Cook and 
Eubank and constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient sentence 
still addresses all the other sentencing objectives - protection of society, punishment, and 
deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)(requiring that alternative 
sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). The District Court not only ignored 
the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney, it also ignored the recommendation of 
the defense that the Court retain jurisdiction and send Mr. Lamb on a rider. (See Tr., pp. 
36-37). This constituted an abuse of its discretion, as the District Court was required to 
5 The defense argued that, in light of all the mitigating factors in this case, Mr. Lamb 
should have been afforded an opportunity at retained jurisdiction. (Tr., 36-37). 
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"consider[ ] all of the circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less 
structured environment .... " Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals provided guidance on this issue in State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348 (Ct. App. 1988). In Carrasco, the Court of Appeals reviewed a sentence 
of thirty years indeterminate for heroin and cocaine delivery charges. The prosecution 
had recommended a sentence of ten years determinate. Relying in part on the fact that 
the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation was ignored and that instead, "the district 
judge went a step further" and imposed a thirty year sentence, the Court of Appeals 
overturned the sentence, and reduced it by a third. Id. at 354. In doing so, the Court of 
Appeals recognized the state's recommendation as a factor to consider in the sentencing 
decision. The Carrasco Court also noted that the reduced sentence would provide 
"correctional authorities greater flexibility in granting [the defendant] a parole, if and 
when he earn[ed] it." Id. at 355. Mr. Lamb urges this Court to adopt the logic of the 
Carrasco decision and apply it directly to the facts in his case. 
In Mr. Lamb's case, if the sentencing court had imposed a sentence even 
somewhat close to the sentence recommended by the parties, it would still have imposed 
a substantial prison sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of 
the imposed sentence would still be present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 
(Ct. App. 2008)( discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). However, the sentence would not be "longer than reasonably necessary to 
deter similar conduct in the future, to exact retribution, or to protect society." Carrasco, 
114 Idaho at 355. 
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In addition to the restriction of his liberty at the discretion of the Department of 
Corrections and his looming sentence, the defendant will also suffer deprivation of 
several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm)6, since this was a felony 
offense. Furthermore, the Idaho Board of Pardons and Parole retains the ability to revoke 
the parole and execute the original sentence if Mr. Lamb were to fail to adhere to the 
terms of his parole upon his release from prison. However, it could do so knowing that 
each of the statutory sentencing objectives had been properly addressed initially at the 
sentencing phase. 
Based upon these factors, Mr. Lamb asserts that the District Court insufficiently 
considered all the mitigating factors, which led to its imposition of a clearly excessive 
sentence in an abuse of its discretion. Mr. Lamb prays that this Court remand this case 
with instructions to remedy that abuse of discretion. 
IL 
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Failed To Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation Of Mr. Lamb Prior To Sentencing 
Mr. Lamb's mental health status was a significant factor at sentencing. The 
District Court specifically mentioned Mr. Lamb's mental health issues during sentencing. 
(Tr. p. 55). The PSR attachments included mental health diagnoses. See, PSR, 
attachment 1, pp. 1, 5; attachment 2, pp. 7, 9, 14. Nonetheless, the District Court 
proceeded forward at sentencing without a separate mental health evaluation. 
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
LC. § 19-2522 is discretionary. State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (Ct. App. 2010). 
6 Mr. Lamb enjoys hunting and shooting, and therefore the penalty of losing the right to 
possess firearms is a significant additional punishment for him. (See PSR, p. 6) 
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However, as with any exercise of discretion, the district court's determination must be 
consistent with applicable legal standards. Id. "The legal standards governing the court's 
decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. § 19-
2522." State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409 (Ct. App. 2007). Idaho Code §19-2522 
provides that a mental health evaluation is mandatory if there is reason to believe that the 
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good 
cause shown. State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 
125 Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Mr. Lamb's counsel did not object to the lack of a psychological or mental health 
evaluation in accordance with I.C. §19-2522 prior to the District Court's judgment of 
conviction. However, a district court is under an independent duty to order a mental 
health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 under certain circumstances, even in absence of a 
request on the part of the defendant or his counsel. "A claim that the district court abused 
its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation of a defendant 
before sentencing can be made on appeal without an objection to the lack of an 
evaluation or a request for an evaluation before the district court." State v. Durham, 146 
Idaho 364, 366 (Ct. App. 2008). In that situation, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the district court manifestly disregarded the relevant provisions of Idaho Criminal Rule 
32 by failing to order the psychological examination. Id. If the court's comments 
indicate that it found the defendant's mental condition and rehabilitative potential to be 
significant factors, and the district court nonetheless proceeds to sentencing "without the 
benefit of a professional diagnosis of that condition and prognosis for improvement," 
("Interests and Activities"). 
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these are factors that support a finding under LC. § 19-2522 that a mental health 
evaluation is required. See A.fcFarland, 125 Idaho at 881. 
The analysis under LC. § 19-2522 focuses on factors relevant to appropriate 
punishment, such as the degree of the defendant's illness and level of impairment, which 
may impact upon the defendant's overall culpability for the offense; the available 
treatments for his condition, along with the risks and benefits of treatment or non-
treatment; and a consideration of the risk of danger that the defendant might pose if 
released back into the community. LC. §19-2522(3). 
The evidence before the District Court at Mr. Lamb's sentencing failed to address 
nearly all of the critical factors that are required to be included within a mental health 
evaluation for sentencing purposes. Unfortunately, the PSR contained limited mental 
health information for Mr. Lamb. (See generally, PSR, p. 8) However, the PSR author 
was well aware of the Psycho-Sexual Evaluation (See id.), having mentioned and 
discussed the Evaluation in the PSR, and having attached a copy to the PSR for the 
Court's consideration at sentencing. In the Evaluation, Mr. Lamb is clearly diagnosed 
with mental health issues, including Mood Disorder and "personality disorder with 
schizotypal features". See PSR, attachment 1, p. 1; attachment 2, p. 9. Despite clear 
indications from the psycho-sexual evaluator that Mr. Lamb had significant mental health 
issues, the PSR author made no mention of these issues in the PSR section regarding 
mental health. (See PSR, p. 8). This was error. 
Unfortunately, the District Court compounded this error by not following up on 
this information and requiring a mental health evaluation. This omission clearly violates 
the dictates of Idaho Code § 19-2522, which requires a court to consider such an 
evaluation under Mr. Lamb's circumstances. 
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Compounding the problem, the District Court specifically mentioned Mr. Lamb's 
mental health issues at the Sentencing Hearing, (see Tr., p. 55), yet made no effort to 
follow through with the mandate under Idaho Code to order a separate mental health 
evaluation. Since there was no mental health evaluation, it follows that there was no 
evaluation of what treatments were potentially available to Mr. Lamb in order to address 
his mental conditions, or any evaluation of the potential risk to the public if Mr. Lamb 
were to receive mental health treatment in lieu of incarceration. 
The information available to the District Court prior to sentencing made it clear 
that there was reason to believe that Mr. Lamb's mental condition would be a significant 
factor at sentencing. However, the information properly available to the District Court 
did not adequately meet the requirements of LC. § 19-2522(3). In light of this, the 
District Court acted with manifest disregard for the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2522 
and 2523 when it failed to order a psychological report or mental health evaluation for 
sentencing purposes. This Court should remedy this error and remand the case 
according! y. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing, Mr. Lamb respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
In the alternative, Mr. Lamb respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence, and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation 
of Mr. Lamb's mental health conditions is made in accordance with LC. § 19-2522 and 
I.C.R. 32. 
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In the alternative, Mr. Lamb respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
District Court's judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 
PAULE. RIGGINS 
Attorney for Appellant Lamb 
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